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LEGAL HISTORIES OF AMERICA’S SECOND 
REVOLUTIONARY WAR (1860-1876) 
Leslie Friedman Goldstein* 
KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE 
PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 
(CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 2014). PP. 326. HARDBACK $113.00. 
PAPERBACK $36.99. 
WILLIAM A. BLAIR, WITH MALICE TOWARD SOME: TREASON 
AND LOYALTY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA (UNIVERSITY OF NORTH 
CAROLINA PRESS 2014). PP. 432. HARDCOVER $40.00.  
LAURA F. EDWARDS, A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR AND 
RECONSTRUCTION: A NATION OF RIGHTS (CAMBRIDGE 
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2015). PP. 226. HARDCOVER $82.00. PAPERBACK 
$25.99. 
The actual title of the Laura Edwards book, A Legal History of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, could be applied to all three of these books, and yet they have hardly 
anything in common. Consequently, I will lay out the main themes and arguments of 
each book separately, mentioning occasional overlaps, or insights provoked, as I pro-
ceed. 
The Laura Edwards book struck me as at least as much a social history as a legal 
one, with a dash of political history thrown in. It does mention the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments, but does not discuss them in any depth. The Ed-
wards book also mentions the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the two Habeas Corpus Acts 
of 1863 and 1867, the Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871, and the Ku Klux Klan 
Act of 1871 but again, does not give them extensive discussion.1 For instance, Ed-
wards’s book does not even mention that the Justice Department was officially cre-
ated in 1870 to carry out all these new laws.2 It describes a handful of well-known 
court cases, including: The Slaughter-House Cases (1873), Cruikshank (1876), the Civil 
Rights Cases (1883), Plessy (1896, which is mis-dated as 1898), but again one does not 
                                                          
 * Judge Hugh M. Morris Professor of Political Science Emerita, University of Delaware. 
 1. LAURA F. EDWARDS, A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION: A NATION OF RIGHTS 
150 (2015).  
 2. About DOJ, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/about.  
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receive more than a brief summary of the social contexts, legal issues, and resolutions 
of each case.3 
There are mysteries of legal history in this Civil War-Reconstruction period that 
I would love to have seen explored in the Edwards book: Why was the Fifteenth 
Amendment adopted even though eight northern states voted down black suffrage 
from 1865 to 1868 period? The issue is not mentioned in this book.4 Another mys-
tery: Why was the Federal Code changed and by whom, in the process of supposedly 
merely codifying it in 1874, such that Sections Three and Four of the Enforcement 
Act of 1870 went from outlawing interferences with the vote on account of race or 
previous servitude to outlawing interferences with the vote simply?5 This too, is not 
mentioned. 
The central focus of the Edwards book, however, is neither Supreme Court 
cases nor constitutional or statutory changes brought about by the Civil War. Instead, 
Laura Edwards appears to be primarily interested in the intersection among laws, 
public policy, and social history. So Edwards’s book contains a discussion of a variety 
of economic policies: the Homestead Act of 1862; the Morrill Land Grant Act of 
1862; the establishment of a formal Department of Agriculture (also 1862); the fi-
nancing of the Civil War through the issuance of bonds that ordinary people could 
and did buy (so-called “seven-thirties,” the original U.S. Savings bonds); the increased 
nationalization of the regulation of state banks; the issuance of greenbacks not backed 
by gold (and the two corresponding Supreme Court cases); the massive governmental 
subsidization of a transcontinental railroad; the issuance of a highly popular income 
tax (that hit only the very wealthy); and the imposition of protective tariffs to help 
native industries.6  
Edwards also devotes a full chapter of her book to describing legal develop-
ments within the Confederacy.7 Wartime necessity brought about centralized govern-
ment not only in the Union but also in the Confederacy. Just as in the Union, the 
Confederacy made extensive use of martial law and the suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus. The Confederacy Constitution was closely modeled after the U.S. 
Constitution, but for (1) the addition of an explicit description of the Confederacy as 
a union of states, (2) the absence of a Supreme Court, (3) the explicit protection of 
slave property, and (4) bans on protective tariffs and internal improvement projects 
(the latter, unenforced).8 Its framers voted down permission for secession or nullifi-
cation.9  
                                                          
 3. Edwards, supra note 1, at 162-65 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873); United States v. Cruik-
shank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).  
 4. WILLIAM A. BLAIR, WITH MALICE TOWARD SOME: TREASON AND LOYALTY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 294 
(2014) (summarily discussing this issue along with a list of relevant factors).  
 5. See PAM BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION 122-24 (2011). 
 6. See EDWARDS, supra note 1; see also BLAIR, supra note 4 (discussing the imposition of numerous, highly un-
popular federal excise taxes, a topic not addressed in Edwards’s book).  
 7. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 42-63.  
 8. Id. at 52. 
 9. Id. at 45. 
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Formal centralization, however, did not translate to efficacious authority.10 The 
violent chaos of racially motivated mob violence that later confronted Northern 
troops trying to manage the South during Reconstruction, Edwards implicitly sug-
gests, had its roots in the failure of the Confederate government to keep its citizenry 
supplied even with basic foodstuffs during the war.11 Bread riots were not unusual. 
Government throughout the South lost its legitimacy during the war. By the end of 
the war, the Confederate Congress was so desperate for troops that it offered slaves 
freedom if they would enlist as armed troops.12 This fact shocked me, and I wish 
Edwards offered more of a legal history on how the Confederate Congress’s offer 
came about. 
As in her chapters on the North, Edwards provides a good deal of description 
of economic policy development in the South.13 She also provides a stark picture of 
how overmatched the Confederacy was. For instance, the Confederacy had a popu-
lation of eight million (of whom 5.5 million were free), compared to the North’s 
twenty-two million. Further, the Confederacy had a manufacturing base worth $69 
million, compared to the Union’s worth $813 million.14 
Certain aspects of legal change normally associated with the Civil War that, in 
contrast to the general pattern of the book, do receive helpful, extensive discussion 
are the very beginnings of the war and the Emancipation.15 
Edwards gives an excellent, blow-by-blow account of how the fighting began 
and how the states decided where to align. Seven deep-South states declared them-
selves out of the United States and in the Confederate States of America in February 
1861.16 On April 12, 1861, South Carolina’s militia fired on Fort Sumter, where fed-
eral troops surrendered the very next day. Two days later, April 15, Lincoln called up 
militia from each state, totaling a force of 75,000, to put down the rebellion. At this 
point, state officials had to choose a side. Within the next two months, Virginia, 
North Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas seceded. Missouri held a referendum in 
March; the Union won, but the governor wanted to align with the Confederacy and 
ordered Missouri’s militia to seize federal arsenals. Federal troops chased down the 
governor and imposed martial law. In Maryland, pro-Confederacy gangs attacked a 
Pennsylvania regiment and destroyed telegraph lines and railroad bridges.17 Lincoln 
sent in militia units, which then occupied Baltimore, and on April 27, he suspended 
habeas corpus along the railway corridor that ran Philadelphia-Wilmington-Balti-
more-D.C. After these disorders, Lincoln called up an additional 42,000 volunteers 
to strengthen Union forces. In July of the same year, Union troops lost a major battle 
                                                          
 10. Id. at 56.  
 11. Id. at 57.  
 12. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 59.  
 13. See id. at 47-63.  
 14. EDWARDS, supra note 1; see EMORY M THOMAS, THE CONFEDERACY AS A REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE 
79-80 (1970).  
 15. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 16-41, 64-89.  
 16. Id. at 18-21.  
 17. Id.  
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at Bull Run. The war was on.18  
Edwards gives considerable attention to the fact that numerous slaves freed 
themselves by running off to join Union lines (and that later numerous freed blacks 
petitioned government officials, both military and civilian, for rights enhancement).19 
Once the slaves arrived, however, commanders had no clear guidelines on how to 
cope with them. Technically the Fugitive Slave Act was still in effect. Commanders 
on the ground adlibbed. General Benjamin F. Butler (May 1861) treated the runaways 
in Virginia as contraband and held them to be used for labor within the military.20 
Better that they helped the Union than the Confederacy, thought General Butler. By 
contrast, in that same month in Missouri, Brigadier General William Harney sent the 
runaways he encountered “carefully” back to their owners.21 In November 1861, 
General William T. Sherman held the runaway slaves in Kentucky until masters re-
quested them, or else turned them over to a local sheriff.22 Meanwhile, in August of 
1861, Congress ended the uncertainty at least as to rebel territory, by adopting the 
First Confiscation Act.23 All property used to support the rebellion could be seized 
by Union forces, and this included slave property.24  
General John C. Fremont went further than mere seizure; he used his martial 
law power in Missouri in September 1861 to free all the slaves in that state.25 Lincoln 
promptly countermanded the order and replaced Fremont.26 In December of that 
year, Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, in his annual report penned a forceful de-
fense of abolishing slavery in all of the territory captured by Union troops.27 Lincoln 
ordered Cameron to delete this section of the report, and shortly thereafter replaced 
Cameron with Edward Stanton. In March of 1862, Congress adopted an article of 
war that forbade commanders from returning slaves to their owners.28 In April, Con-
gress abolished slavery in D.C. and paid compensation to the owners.29 In May of the 
same year, General David Hunter used his authority as military commander govern-
ing conquered territory to declare martial law and free all the slaves in South Carolina, 
Georgia, and Florida. Lincoln immediately nullified Hunter’s emancipation order.30 
In June of 1862, Congress abolished slavery in all federal territories, but with no com-
pensation. At Lincoln’s request, that same year Congress pledged compensation to 
owners in the loyal, border states if they would give up their slaves.31 The Second 
                                                          
 18. Id.  
 19. See id. at 67-82.  
 20. EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 72-73.  
 21. Id. at 75.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 76. 
 24. Id. at 71-82.  
 25. EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 20.  
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. at 77-78; see Draft and Final Versions of a Passage in the Secretary of War’s Annual Report, FREEDMEN AND 
SOUTHERN SOC’Y PROJECT, http://www.history.umd.edu/Freedmen/cameron.htm.  
 28. EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 78.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 79.  
 31.  Id. at 80.  
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Confiscation Act was adopted in July 1862.32 This law not only held the escaped 
slaves safely behind Union lines, but it also declared them free, if they were owned 
by members of the Confederacy who lived in territory that the Union controlled, so 
long as the master did not surrender to the U.S. government within the next sixty 
days.33 Both Blair and Edwards omit this last detail. I infer from this detail that Lin-
coln then expanded upon the strategy (from the Second Confiscation Act) of threat-
ening Emancipation as a way to induce surrender.34 By September of 1862, President 
Lincoln issued the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, offering rebellious states 
100 days to surrender. If they did, their residents could retain their slaves. If not, 
slaves in rebel states would be deemed free as of January 1, 1863.35  
On the same day the Second Confiscation Act was enacted (July 17, 1862), 
Congress also adopted a Militia Act that allowed enlistment by black soldiers.36 In 
June 1864, Congress repealed the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, and legislated equal pay 
for white and black soldiers.37 Although Edwards does not say so, this second move 
shows important progress in Union sentiment; equality under the law for the two 
races had not been politically thinkable as a feasible option in 1862. By 1864, how-
ever, the Union had taken a giant step toward the equal protection that just two years 
later Congress would place into its proposal for the Fourteenth Amendment that it 
was sending for ratification.  
By the fall of 1864 Lincoln abandoned his Ten Percent Reconstruction Plan 
(announced in the December 1863 Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction), 
which would have left abolition to the progressive ten percent within each state who 
might be willing to pledge loyalty to the Union and abolish slavery; rather, Lincoln 
announced his support for the Thirteenth Amendment, which passed the Senate as 
early as April 1864.38 Once Lincoln won re-election, the House endorsed the Thir-
teenth Amendment also and sent it to the states in January of 1865. Even before the 
Thirteenth Amendment achieved ratification, at Lincoln’s request, in March 1865, 
Congress established the Bureau of Freedmen and Abandoned Lands (“Freedman’s 
Bureau”).39 The Freedman’s Bureau, subordinate to the military, was established to 
handle disputes that resulted from the ending of slavery.40 Lee surrendered to Grant 
on April 9, 1865 and Lincoln was shot on April 14, 1865. Andrew Johnson stepped 
into the presidency on April 15.41 
Edwards makes an insightful point in describing the ratification of the Thir-
teenth Amendment. As Andrew Johnson met with Southern leaders to persuade 
                                                          
 32. Id.; see BLAIR, supra note 4, at 83-91 (discussing this law and noting the Congressional debate lasted from 
December 1861 into July 1862).  
 33. EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 81.  
 34. See id. at 71-82.  
 35. Id. at 71-82. 
 36. Id. at 85.  
 37. Id. at 85, 95. 
 38. EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 90-120.  
 39. Id. at 95. 
 40. Id. at 95.  
 41. Id. at 92-95.  
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them to accept the Ten Percent Reconstruction Plan, he minimized the legal power 
of the Thirteenth Amendment. Many (if not most) of its supporters in Congress 
viewed it as abolishing not only the legal relationship of slavery, but also the “badges 
and incidents of slavery”; in other words, bringing about full civil equality.42 Edwards 
describes this as “civil and political equality,” but I view her assessment as a stretch.43 
Edwards further tells us that Johnson “made explicit assurances to representatives of 
the former Confederate states to obtain the required votes” for the Thirteenth 
Amendment, to the effect that it “eliminated slavery and no more.”44 We learn that 
by December 6, 1865, when ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment was made 
official by the assent of Georgia, twenty-seven of the thirty-six Union states had also 
ratified. Ultimately, the Thirteenth Amendment attained a three-fourths vote both 
north and south, although the Southern votes were not only coerced by being kept 
out of Congress unless they would ratify, but also were misled as to the import of the 
Amendment. 
Meanwhile, in the summer of 1865, the Southern states followed the Ten Per-
cent Plan and adopted constitutions that abandoned secession and outlawed slavery, 
but proceeded to adopt detailed Black Codes, expanding upon antebellum statutes 
that had restricted free blacks. Edwards gives only a paragraph to these and does not 
detail the degree to which they virtually re-enslaved Southern blacks.45 When Con-
gress reconvened in 1866, after ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, they re-
jected newly arrived Southern Congressional slates, which were led by the same men 
who had recently led the war against the Union. Next they set about proposing the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which would seal into the Constitution the advances of the 
1866 Civil Rights Act for citizen rights (says Edwards), but also protect equal protec-
tion and due process of law for all persons.46 Whole books (Kurt Lash’s, for in-
stance)47 have been written about the complexities of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
so I found Edwards’s treatment rather cursory, but perhaps she was constrained by 
her publisher into keeping her book short. 
Since Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment introduces into the Consti-
tution a privileging of males, Edwards then devotes a section of her book to the 
hierarchical structure of nineteenth century laws in the states. These laws privileged 
the propertied male householder and denied rights to women and to subordinated 
workers generally.48 Edwards returns to this theme at great length later in her book.49  
Because gold and silver were discovered in the Mountain West in the 1850s, 
Euro-Americans flooded into Colorado, Nevada, the Dakotas, Idaho, Arizona, and 
Montana. These all became territories during the Civil War, and the massive increase 
                                                          
 42. See id. at 88, 103-04.  
 43. Id. at 88.  
 44. Id. at 88, 103-04.  
 45. EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 97.  
 46. See id. at 100-03.  
 47. See LASH, infra note 109. 
 48.  EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 110-13.  
 49. Id. at 137-62, 166-73.  
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in population of Euro-Americans eventually led to bloody conflicts with the Indians. 
Edwards therefore offers a six-page excursion into Indian law,50 that concludes with 
a passage asserting that the long-term seizure of Indian land that went on “was, es-
sentially, the uncompensated seizure of property without due process of law.”51 She 
makes no mention of the contrary argument by celebrated Indian law scholar Felix 
Cohen. Cohen maintained that for all its real horrors, Indian Removal involved pur-
chase from Indian tribes of virtually every acre, in sharp contrast to the policies re-
garding treatment of indigenous property in South America, Canada, and Australia.52 
To select just one of myriad examples, the U.S., having paid Napoleon fifteen million 
dollars for the right to rule the Louisiana Territory, then turned around and paid the 
Native Americans three hundred million dollars for that property (exclusive of the 
cessions the U.S. reserved to the tribes). Through almost four hundred treaties, the 
United States purchased over two million square miles of land from Indian tribes at 
an estimated cost of at least eight hundred million dollars.53  
Laura Edwards believes that Reconstruction failed not simply because of South-
erners’ intense, violent, and implacable racial hostility and accompanying resentment 
against the Civil War Amendments and enforcement acts that was far too massive 
and enduring for the weakly developed federal infrastructure to handle.54 Edwards 
identifies a second cause of the failure as follows: The “new legal [postbellum] order 
that was national in scope [was] composed of citizens who were equal in theory, but 
unequal in practice.”55 The promotion of industrialization, implicit in the tariff sys-
tem, for instance, resulted in wage workers economically less equal (compared to pre-
industrialization) than factory owners or railroad magnates, even as Emancipation 
and the Fourteenth Amendment promised equality before the law. After acknowl-
edging that “[v]iolence overwhelmed [Reconstruction],”56 Edwards argues that, 
nonetheless 
[T]he intransigence of white southerners and the fecklessness of white northerners 
were not the only problems. . . . The law’s underlying logic sustained profound ine-
qualities, at odds with the kinds of legal equality that freed people and other Americans 
[e.g., women, wage laborers, American Indians] envisioned for themselves. . . . [T]he 
legal challenges of Reconstruction were not peculiarly southern; they were national in 
scope.57 
Edwards makes this argument at great length in this short book.58 I found it specula-
tive rather than documented, and largely unpersuasive. 
To Laura Edwards’s credit, she recognizes and acknowledges the importance 
                                                          
 50. Id. at 113-19.  
 51. Id. at 118.  
 52. Felix Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 34 (1948).  
 53. Id. at 35-40. 
 54. EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 151.  
 55. Id. at 18; see id. at 40-41, 110, 112, 119, 124-27.  
 56. Id. at 144.  
 57. Id. at 152.  
 58. See id. at 137-62, 166-73.  
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of Pam Brandwein’s powerful re-examination and recasting of the Supreme Court’s 
role during the waning of Reconstruction.59 The Supreme Court under Chief Justice 
Waite was not the bête noir that many scholars have made it out to be. The country, in 
fact, lacked the political will to make Reconstruction stick. 
Whereas the Edwards book often left me hungering for more details of legal 
history, William Blair’s book, With Malice Toward Some, offers a sharp contrast.60 It is 
elegantly argued, superbly documented, thick with descriptive detail, and chock-full 
of information. Blair provides thorough discussion not only about the complexities 
of official government policies towards the complicated matters of treason and dis-
loyalty as legal and political problems, but also about law-on-the-ground, as enforced 
and unenforced at the local level, and via collective community behavior that oper-
ated as custom with the force of law (e.g., the storming and destroying locally unpop-
ular printing presses) during the Civil War.61 A review of the brevity required here 
cannot do justice to the degree of detail contained in With Malice Toward Some. Blair’s 
book is an eye-opener. 
The matter of treason and disloyalty was complicated because the U.S. was en-
gaged in a civil war; the more the Union advanced, the more the Union government 
had to manage and cope with a fundamentally disloyal citizenry. The U.S. govern-
mental infrastructure was not prepared for this, so the military ended up engaged in 
governance through martial law in much of the country.62 
A glaring fact becomes clear by Chapter Two.63 What twentieth and twenty-
first century citizens have come to believe about the First Amendment freedoms of 
speech, press, and religion simply did not prevail during the Civil War. Speech and 
press, even speech during a religious service delivered as the sermon by professional 
clergy, that discouraged enlistment or defended slavery could and did lead to arrests, 
and lots of them. Popular sentiment strongly endorsed this reading of the First 
Amendment. My saying “even” professional clergy is misleading. In fact, during the 
Civil War, throughout the Union as well as in the conquered rebellious states, pro-
fessional clergy and newspaper editors—the very folks that one would think had spe-
cial First Amendment protection—were the ones targeted by officials for arrest. 
My reading of Blair’s book caused me to surmise that Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, a veteran of the Civil War, may well have been influenced by having lived 
through this legal era while at an impressionable age. Justice Holmes’ opinion in 
Schenck v. U.S. has always struck me as making mincemeat of the freedoms at stake, 
since Schenck went to prison for simply urging Americans to write Congress and 
claim the (World War I) draft law violated their rights protected by the Thirteenth 
Amendment.64 This book has convinced me that there is no doubt that Schenck 
would have been imprisoned for comparable speech (likening the draft to slavery) 
during the Civil War, likely without arousing much controversy. Times have changed. 
                                                          
 59. BRANDWEIN, supra note 5, at 122-24. 
 60. See BLAIR, supra note 4.  
 61. See id.  
 62. See, e.g., id. at 112.  
 63. See, id. at 36-65.  
 64. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).  
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To return to the Blair book, the system of arrests for disloyal activity and activity 
understood to undermine the Union’s efforts to suppress the traitorous military up-
rising in the South, was carried out in large part by a complex array of federal officials 
hired and supervised by the military. This complex array of federal officials (often 
called “provost marshals”) was supplemented by federal bureaucrats, their hirelings, 
and local civilian officials, themselves often pressed into action by aroused loyal citi-
zens, who otherwise might resort to mob behavior.65 This system of combatting dis-
loyalty extended to interdiction of the mails; capturing spies; suppressing newspapers; 
enforcing loyalty in the churches, editorial offices, and elsewhere by requiring loyalty 
oaths in order to hold a wide range of professional jobs; making political arrests; and 
stationing soldiers at polling places to help enforce loyalty oaths. The latter occasion-
ally engaged in egregious excesses like closing the polls hours early.66 
In the plentiful illustrative anecdotes that Blair provides, one can discern a pat-
tern. While the enforcement system offered many reasons modern Americans might 
call it a police state, what saves the system from warranting that label is that (perhaps, 
because there simply were not enough jails and jailers to deal with the crowds), people 
who arrested for disloyalty were not held long—perhaps a month or two—and then 
would be released after taking a loyalty oath.67 Often the order to release them, or an 
order to restrain the behavior of soldiers monitoring polling places, came from the 
top—either Lincoln himself or Secretary of War Stanton.68 
Blair’s book contains a lot of interesting legal history. The book takes readers 
back over the course of pre-Civil War United States history to explain why no one 
was ever executed for treason against the U.S., except abolitionist John Brown (and 
he was executed by the state of Virginia, not the federal government).69 The U.S. 
Constitution, precisely to prevent anyone’s punishment merely for traitorous speech, 
spells out that treason consists of an overt act of levying war against the U.S. or giving 
aid and comfort to its wartime enemies, and that there must be at least two witnesses 
to the overt act.70 The Constitution (Sixth Amendment) also requires that prosecution 
for any federal crime (treason included) take place in “the state and district wherein 
such crime shall have been committed.”71 Federal officials were far from confident 
that the neighbors of Southern heroes like Jefferson Davis, Robert E. Lee, and Stone-
wall Jackson would convict them to be hung for treason after the war ended. So the 
cases were never prosecuted.72 
As for activities short of “levying war” that helped the enemy—for instance: 
speaking in favor of the Confederacy or against enlistment in the Union army; smug-
gling food or other needed supplies to neighboring Southern states; and participating 
                                                          
 65. See, e.g., BLAIR, supra note 4, at 54, 100, 101, 119, 143-44, 180.  
 66. Id.  
 67. See BLAIR, supra note 4. 
 68. Id. at 54, 108.  
 69. Id. at 13.  
 70. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.  
 71. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 72. BLAIR, supra note 4, at 240-41.  
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in Copperhead gang-style attacks on telegraph lines or on railroad lines, as mentioned 
in Edwards’s book—the U.S. actually lacked useful statutes.73 Below the crime of 
treason (which carried a statutory death penalty) there at first existed only the misde-
meanor of “obstruction of [a federal] officer in the performance of his duty . . . .”74 
Under this law, a convicted murderer of a U.S. marshal, for instance, could receive 
“a maximum penalty of one year in jail and a fine of three hundred dollars.”75  
Congress soon addressed this lacuna, by adopting two Conspiracies Acts, one 
in 1861 and the other in 1862; both laws made punishable various ways of plotting 
against the government.76 While probably thousands of cases of disloyalty during the 
war were processed this way (one study of just southern Illinois located hundreds), 
the bulk of disloyalty cases were dealt with more summarily under martial law provi-
sions, by just locking people up (usually for short periods) and confiscating contra-
band.77  
Two important contributions from Blair’s book include (1) a detailed descrip-
tion of the provost marshal system, the enforcement apparatus for the quasi-police-
state conditions during the Civil War, and, (2) a detailed intellectual history of legal 
thinkers from the period, including professors, lower court judges who adjudicated 
the Prize Cases, members of Congress, and attorneys who, while working as counsel 
for the federal government on the Prize Cases, had to grapple with the conundrum 
posed by the waging of the Civil War.78 The problem was that the official Union 
position began by judging the fighting in the South to be an illegal insurrection.79 To 
call it a “war,” in order to justify what were in international law terms known to be 
acts of war, such as instituting blockades of ports and summarily confiscating con-
traband without trials, would seem to acknowledge the Confederacy’s official posi-
tion, that it was a sovereign state.80 If the Confederacy were indeed a sovereign state, 
it would have had the right to expel U.S. troops from Fort Sumter, and so forth, and 
the North would have no justification for war.81 
This dilemma instigated the relevant legal thinkers to turn to treatises on inter-
national law, whether foreigners like Emmerich de Vattel, or scholars like Francis 
Lieber, who digested people like Vattel and Hugo Grotius for the domestic market.82 
International law had established that long-term insurrection could be treated as war; 
the powers of war turned insurrectionists (i.e., domestic criminals) into belligerents 
(military enemies).83 Once the war ended, the side that had put down the insurrection 
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could then return to domestic law and punish the appropriate leaders for treasonous 
behavior, at least in principle.84 This concept of insurrection-turned-war allowed for 
avoiding the massive bloodletting that could result from one side treating every single 
opposing combatant as literally committing treason by waging war against the gov-
ernment.85 Both Lieber and William Whiting, “solicitor” in the War Department, had 
developed influential legal policies, derived from their study of international law, that 
guided the war (and are detailed in Blair’s book).86 Even people like Congressman 
Samuel Shellabarger (GOP) in February of 1862 made the argument that the Presi-
dent, under the Constitution, has both a peace power and a war power.87 The latter 
is his power as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.88 But the nature of the 
President’s war power comes from the law of nations.89 Since the Constitution gives 
the power, it is not one held against the Constitution. Still, it is (per the law of nations) 
a plenary power to do what is necessary to preserve the nation and its form of gov-
ernment.90  
The war power had domestic applications that are uncomfortable for us twenty-
first century Americans to confront. The security apparatus of the Civil War years 
included several layers, all of which made life difficult for anyone expressing the least 
opposition to the draft, the Union war effort, recruitment of black soldiers, or, after 
September of 1862, Emancipation. Blair describes how it all worked: starting with 
the Conscription Act of 1863, provost marshals were appointed for each Congres-
sional district by military officials to supervise the draft and to find, arrest, and pre-
vent desertion.91 Further, the provost marshals could hire assistants.92 They super-
vised the district with power to arrest people for interfering with the draft or 
recruitment through disloyal conduct or speech.93 Meanwhile, state and local govern-
ments also had officials involved in supervision and arrest.94 Moreover, other federal 
officials got in on the act: the State Department hired civilian detectives and U.S. 
Attorneys directed federal marshals to detain civilians.95  
In the first two years of the war (1861-1862), marshals working for the military 
basically played a military police (“MP”) role, disciplining soldiers for drunkenness, 
gambling, and so on, and investigating civilian complaints about soldiers.96 As early 
as August of 1861, however, General George B. McClellan ordered Colonel Andrew 
Porter (head of the provost marshal system) to use his men to surveil “all persons in 
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this city [Baltimore?] who are disposed inimically to the government.”97 Porter then 
screened the mail and used State Department detectives to monitor suspicious per-
sons. In September, General McClellan carried out orders to arrest Maryland legisla-
tors, newspaper editors, and other public officials. To support this effort, General 
McClellan deployed detective Allen Pinkerton, local officials, and troops throughout 
Maryland.98 After this, the provost marshal system bifurcated, with one branch be-
coming MPs who also guarded roads, railroads, and telegraph lines against sabotage.99 
The other kind of provost marshal had civilian governance duties.100 They were ap-
pointed by military officials to govern communities during the war.101 In politically 
charged cities, like St. Louis or Baltimore, they made lots of arrests, but also regulated 
daily life by issuing travel passes, restricting mail, supervising prisoners, administering 
loyalty oaths, and authorizing commerce and trade.102  
One critical time for the development of this security apparatus was late sum-
mer of 1862. Secretary Stanton appointed an internal security commissioner, Simon 
Draper to coordinate efforts to prevent desertion and encourage recruitment by en-
gaging the Union’s state governors, local police, and state officials.103 Stanton then 
empowered all U.S. marshals and police superintendents to imprison persons who 
may have, by speech or writing, discouraged enlistment or acted disloyally in any 
other way.104 On top of all this, the military had control of large parts of the country 
via martial law.105 With all these overlapping jurisdictions, persons even a little bit 
critical of the Lincoln administration had plenty to fear.106  
The Blair volume details the deployment of this provost marshal system and 
Democratic complaints about abuses of this system and of an overbearing military 
that interfered with civilian liberties.107 The complaints grew in volume during the 
election of 1864. Blair’s book also describes real reasons the government had to fear 
sabotage: Confederates sent agents to Canada who worked with Copperheads around 
the northwestern states to plot seizures of warships in the Great Lakes, rigging the 
gold market, burning boats on the Mississippi and hotels in New York City, raiding 
banks in St. Albans, Vermont, and seizing northern POW camps in an attempt to 
release Confederate prisoners who could join with the Sons of Liberty and affiliated 
Copperhead groups to start an insurrection in the North.108 In the end, Blair does not 
take a stand on whether the Union’s running roughshod over civil liberties was justi-
fied in this situation or not. Still, the book makes for a fascinating read. 
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Kurt Lash’s book, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities of 
American Citizenship is essential reading for anyone who has ever wondered, “What 
was he thinking?” upon reading Justice Samuel F. Miller’s opinion for the Slaughter-
House Cases109 or the mutually contradictory speeches of John Bingham (author of 
much of the Fourteenth Amendment) from the Congressional Globe,110 or statements 
from various members of Congress in the Congressional Globe expressing mutually op-
posing views on the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.111 
Many (including Edwards as to the first) believe that the clause, “No State shall 
make any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States,” (properly understood) referred to two bodies of rights: The first set 
is those protected by the 1866 Civil Rights Act (adopted into law over Andrew John-
son’s veto on April 19, 1866), in turn derived from the circuit court opinion of Su-
preme Court Justice Bushrod Washington in Corfield v. Coryell.112 This list of rights, 
specified as equal for white and black citizens in 1866, included the right to “make 
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, 
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property,” and to equality under the law and 
due process of law.113 The second body of rights is the group of the Bill of Rights 
protections listed in the First through Eighth Amendments, which had theretofore 
applied only to the federal government, as now restrictions on the state governments. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, as constitutional law scholars will realize, agreed with 
neither of these positions. Rather, the Supreme Court turned the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause into a near nullity, first in the Slaughter-House Cases of 1873 (a mere 
five years after the Amendment became law) and more emphatically in U.S. v. Cruik-
shank.114 In the Supreme Court’s rendering, the clause secured against state abridge-
ment only those protections that resulted from the citizen’s relation to the federal 
government, such as the right to travel freely from one state to another (because of 
the federal power over commerce among the states), the Article 4, section 2 right to 
be free from discrimination on basic citizen rights based on out-of-state status when 
temporarily within one’s non-home state, the right to take a federal case to federal 
court, and so forth. These rights were already secure from state abridgment under the 
Supremacy Clause; but, the last one listed reminds us why the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause was not (in the Court’s reading) a total nullity. After all, the right to take a 
federal case to federal court is the right that had been denied to the purportedly free 
black, Dred Scott.115 All blacks in 1866 were now free and the first sentence of the 
Fourteenth Amendment repeated the Civil Rights Act’s grant to them of national 
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citizenship and added “citizenship in the state in which they reside.”116 This Citizen-
ship Clause, buttressed by the Supremacy Clause, would have already forbidden states 
to abridge these privileges of national citizenship. Stating this prohibition plainly, as 
a matter of emphasis, is how the Supreme Court of the 1870s seems to have read the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause. Although many have excoriated this minimizing in-
terpretation of the clause, Lash’s book argues that the 1873 reading is more right than 
wrong.117 
Kurt Lash persuasively makes the case in this book that “Justice Miller was 
absolutely right” in the Slaughterhouse Cases in (1) distinguishing state citizen rights 
from federal citizen rights and (2) insisting that the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment added only the latter to restrict state governments.118 
Where Justice Miller went wrong, according to Lash, was in voting with the Court in 
U.S. v. Cruikshank, an 1876 decision where the Court threw out convictions of mur-
derers of many blacks in the Colfax Massacre in New Orleans of 1873.119 The Court 
there faulted the indictments in a number of respects.120 In the process, the Court 
plainly stated that private individuals could not violate Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which addressed state action, and perhaps state failure to act.121 By con-
trast, the Cruikshank majority of eight would allow (more properly drawn) indictments 
of private individuals for interfering with Fifteenth Amendment voting rights (despite 
the fact that the Fifteenth Amendment speaks of denial or abridgment of the right to 
vote “by the United States or by any State”).122 
The reasoning of Cruikshank that is of interest to Lash is the Court’s plain state-
ment that the First and Second Amendment rights (which Cruikshank was accused 
of violating) are rights that do not directly restrict state government; instead, they re-
strict directly only the federal government. Justice Miller, in Slaughter-House, said the 
First Amendment right of peaceable assembly is a right of national citizenship that 
restricts the states, but in Cruikshank he sided with the opinion that explained (and 
limited) this earlier point: The national citizenship right is a right to assemble in order 
to petition Congress or other aspect of the federal government.123 This federal gov-
ernment-related right may not be abridged by Congress or by the states (Supremacy 
Clause and Privileges or Immunities Clause). But, the national right is not a right to 
assemble for purpose of influencing state government or the state-level political pro-
cess. Such rights are left to state constitutions for protection. 
This legal arrangement had been plain since Justice John Marshall’s Barron v. 
Baltimore decision in 1833.124 But, this is precisely the rule that Representative John 
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Brigham and Senator Jacob Howard believed they were overturning with the adop-
tion of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. It is the central argument of Lash’s 
book—one convincingly made—that Representative Bingham’s primary goal was to 
have the restrictions of the Bill of Rights contained in the First through Eighth 
Amendments apply as Congressionally enforceable restrictions on state governments, 
along with any other protections of individual rights specified explicitly or implicitly 
elsewhere in the Constitution.125 Representative Bingham was emphatically not trying 
to nationalize the rights enshrined in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which he twice 
voted against, nor to nationalize the rights listed in Corfield v. Coryell.126 The latter list 
frightened him because of its open-ended quality and because it mentioned suffrage, 
albeit in guarded phrasing. Representative Bingham did not oppose equal protection 
of blacks’ basic civil rights; rather, he favored equal protection for all persons, not 
just citizens, in these rights concerning property, contract, and their protection, and 
he said so in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.127 
Lash’s basic argument is that Senator Jacob Howard and Representative John 
Bingham meant for the Privileges or Immunities Clause to apply the Bill of Rights to 
state governments, and not to apply some unenumerated set of basic rights of the 
“citizens in the several states” to all the states equally.128 Lash also believes this was 
the “Original Meaning” of the clause.129 He defines this term of art as “the likely 
original understanding of the text at the time of its adoption by competent speakers 
of the English language who were aware of the context in which the text was com-
municated for ratification.”130 Lash further makes a strong case that attentive mem-
bers of the House and Senate would have known what the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause meant. Outside of Congress, readers of Senator Howard’s speech introducing 
the Amendment would have or should have grasped the point (although Senator 
Howard is a little murky on the role of the Comity Clause). This speech was published in 
newspapers all over the land. Beyond that, however, it is not clear to me that others 
amongst the adult public understood this Original Meaning. Lash is an honest enough 
scholar that he shows us many grounds for later misunderstanding; for instance, the 
early campaigners for Congressional office in 1866—if they were members of the 
Republican Party—mostly said, “We’re for equal rights, and that’s what this amend-
ment does. It does not give the vote, but makes blacks equal before the law.” Dem-
ocratic Party campaigners accused the Fourteenth Amendment of moving toward the 
unpopular slippery slope that would give blacks the right to vote. By September 1866, 
race riots against peaceful meetings of blacks precipitated claims that the Fourteenth 
Amendment would protect First Amendment rights and Second Amendment (self-
defense) rights, but the public message was hardly crystal clear during the entire rati-
fication period. Then, in January 1871, the Judiciary Committee in Congress, in ex-
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amining the Victoria Woodhull petition that asserted a right to vote under the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause, reported on the meaning of the Amendment in such a 
garbled way that no one could make sense of that explanation, not even Lash. Thus, 
within three years of the Amendment’s ratification, even members of Congress ap-
peared to have been confused about its meaning. Representative Bingham explained 
the meaning of the clause in 1870 and 1871, in terms more clear and cogent than 
many of his earlier statements, but these were apparently not clear enough to con-
vince the Supreme Court only five years later in Cruikshank, when the Court flatly denied 
the meaning attributed to the Privileges or Immunities Clause by its primary author, 
Representative Bingham.131 
In sum, Lash does an excellent job defending the claim that the drafters of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and those members of Congress who voted to send it on 
to the states for ratification, during the debates and ratification period of the 1860s, 
would have known and, in fact intended, the Privileges or Immunities Clause to mean 
Bill of Rights protections and other rights of citizens named in the Constitution 
would now apply to state governments. Lash also does a terrific job tracing the twists 
and turns in Representative Bingham’s views and the reasons for them and, also, 
making lucid what sometimes seems to be an opaque and bewildering set of argu-
ments by others in the Congressional Globe. 
Still, Lash shows in the rhetoric of the day a range of statements by public fig-
ures that could well have caused confusion among members of the general public 
about the sense of the clause.132 I would have liked to read more from Lash about 
why the Supreme Court Justices, or at least eight of them (the lone dissent from 
Clifford not addressing the issue), lost sight of this Original Meaning or deliberately 
turned their backs on it.133 For Lash to just stop short, right after the Court within 
eight years abandons the Original Meaning of an important constitutional clause, 
does make one wonder what may be missing from this account of Original Meaning. 
That said, Lash’s book is nonetheless essential reading for anyone interested in the 
Fourteenth Amendment in particular, or in Original Meaning of the Constitution as 
a whole.134 
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